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Who is Reading the Data on Your Old Computer?
Vivienne Mee
Rits Information Security
Citywest Business Campus
Co. Dublin
Vivienne.Mee@ritsgroup.com
ABSTRACT
Researchers at Rits Information Security performed a study in how the Irish
population disposes of their old computers. How would you dispose of your
old computer, or how would the company you work for dispose of their old
computers?
The majority of Irish homeowners, would bring their old computers to local
civic amenity centres, give it away to a relative or sell it on to another party.
Some organisations would give their old equipment to a staff member, as a gift
gesture, others may simply discard in the local civic amenity site.
What is wrong with the methods currently being used for discarding of our old
PCs?
With this question in mind, Rits Information Security embarked on a study to
highlight the problems home users, and corporate users face when discarding
retired PCs.
In this paper, Rits Information Security describes research in which a number
of hard disks were taken from computers after they had been released for resale
on Irish online auction sites. The research that was undertaken involved an
analysis of the disks to determine if any information remained on these disks,
and whether the information could be easily recovered using commonly
available tools and techniques.
From this analysis, a number of disks could be traced to specific organisations,
including large financial institutions, various consultancy firms, numerous
small trade organisation, auctioneers, and insurance brokers. In addition to
these, a number of computers were found to have originated from the home
environment.
The results indicate that careless disposal of computers and storage media in
the Republic of Ireland is a significant problem. Very few of the disks tested
had undergone a thorough or efficient cleansing process. The level of
information that could be recovered from the majority of the disks tested would
have proven useful for corporate espionage, identity theft, blackmail, and
fraud.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In Ireland, a problem arises for the disposal of redundant computer hardware.
This problem is faced daily by the home user, governments, industry and
academia. Computers have a useful life span of only two to three years. After
this period of time they become obsolete with little or no second hand market.
As the computers are no longer valuable, the proper disposal of the information
from these computers is considered an insignificant factor for the general user.
Whereas for industries and governments, the costs of removing the data from
the systems and ensuring all data is properly removed before they are disposed
of can be a significant factor.
Large organisations tend to dispose of obsolete equipment either through their
own procedures or by use of third party organisations. It is clear from the
results of the disk study that many organisations have neglected their
responsibilities and good business sense in disposing of the data correctly.
It is also common practise of organisations to give computers as gifts to
members of staff. It is evident from the research that either “work from home
PCs” were given to the staff or that computers from the office environment
were given as gifts to the personnel. Often, when this is the case, a simple new
operating system is installed over the old operating system, and given to the
staff member. This however, does not remove all data from the PC therefore
the data can easily be retrieved. The computers still contain business or
personally sensitive information.
Home users tend to discard their PCs in the conventional manner, in the
general purpose rubbish bins, taking them to local civic amenity sites or by
selling them on to other private buyers or in some cases, by trading them in or
selling them at auction. Home users believe they do not have any data that
would be of use to anyone or have taken the steps of “deleting” the files from
the computer. Home users are not aware of the implications of the data that can
be retrieved from their computers.
The research on the disks that originated from individuals’ personal computers
revealed information that could be used for identity theft
This is not just a problem identified in Ireland. In 2003, two MIT students,
Simon Garfinkel and Abhi Shelat, performed a study into disks available on the
second hand market in the United States of America. The study was to become
part of Garfinkel’s PhD thesis. The study started out with the students buying
158 used hard drives from computer stores, small businesses and eBay, the
online auction site(Bruce, 2004). The students recovered a vast amount of
financial information and personal information of the disks.
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From this study, similar disk studies have been taking place yearly since 2003,
in the United Kingdom, Australia, Germany and other countries with the aim to
cause awareness amongst the public of the importance of secure disposal.
In January 2005, a joint report was published by the University of Glamorgan
in Wales and Edith Cowan University in Australia detailing the investigation of
a number of second hand hard disks. The investigation revealed that a large
number of the disks examined still contained significant volumes of sensitive
information (Jones, A., Mee,V .,et al, 2005).
In 2006, British Telecommunications (BT) and Life Cycle Services (LCS)
published a report from disks acquired from not only the UK and Australia, but
also disks from Germany and North America. Again these disks were
purchased at computer auctions, computer fairs or through E-bay in the
respective geographic areas (Jones A, Valli C, Sutherland I and Thomas P,
2006).
This paper describes the research carried out in Ireland in 2007 that repeated
the research performed in previous years in the other countries mentioned. It is
the first known study of its kind in Ireland. This paper contains all of the initial
results found of the research, reporting the types of data that was found along
with the implications of such data.
2. THE RESEARCH
A number of disks were acquired from various Irish online auction sites,
computer fairs and second hand shops. In total 26 disks were obtained. This
seems quite a small number in relation to the number of computers are sold
each year in Ireland. In the UK the same study was performed in 2005 and
2006, in which approximately 111 and 200 respectively disks were used. In
comparison to the UK this small number was deemed adequate considering the
geographical size of Ireland.
In 2004 it was estimated that the PC market in Ireland was estimated to be
2.011 million PCs in 2004. This has grown by an estimated 15% annually.
However, there are no statistics available for how many of these PCs that are
disposed of annually in Ireland. One can estimate that the life of a PC can be
estimated as 3 years in the corporate sector, with perhaps 5 to 7 years for the
home user. In Australia an estimated 1.6 million computers are disposed of
annually (Scott, 2007)
The objective of the research was to determine whether there was any
information on the disks that was visible or recoverable with readily available
tools. These tools used for the research performed similar functions to the
Windows Unformat and Undelete commands, and a hex editor that allows the
user to view information that existed in the unallocated portions of the disk.
These tools are available to anyone who potentially could obtain the disks.
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The research was undertaken using forensically sound methodologies. Each of
the hard disks were forensically imaged, and then placed into secure storage.
Any further research was carried out on the image of the original disk. While
some may query this methodology, as the disks were essentially not computer
evidence but discarded equipment, it was thought to be essential practice as it
allowed all the research to be performed in a non-intrusive manner, therefore, it
did not affect or change any of the original information obtained. It also was
used as a precautionary step, as in the research performed in 2006 by BT,
material found on two of the disks necessitated them being passed to the police
for further information (Jones 2006). In this research, no material was
considered necessary to be passed onto the Garda Síochána (Irish Police – law
enforcement).
Once all the disks were imaged, it was then possible to start the analysis. Each
of the disks were analysed using the tools outlined above. The analysis was
broken into two phases.
The first phase of the analysis was to identify whether or not the hard disk had
any data that was visible during the initial examination. This involved loading
the forensic image and looking to see if a file structure was present. Of the 26
disks, 20 disks were found to have file structures present. This phase was just
an initial look at the disk images, no further tools or techniques were used in
this phase.
The second phase of the analysis was to look for specific information on the
disks that would allow for the identification of the user or organisation from
where the disk originated. This included usernames, organisation names, email
addresses, or documents and databases. The purpose of this phase was to
establish the amount of the disks that could be traced to the individual or
organisation.
3. RESEARCH FINDINGS
Of the 26 disks that were obtained for the research, 5 of the disks had
mechanical faults and were not accessible. The remaining 21 disks were fully
functional, and the following was revealed:
Totally blank: (0/21) 0% of the disks was totally blank and contained
no file structure or data. This implies that no disks were securely
wiped.
Attempts of Removal of data: (8/21) 38% Attempts of removal was
clear. This was a simple format, a simple delete or where a new
installation of an operating system was performed. All of the data on
these disks was recoverable, and all data was clearly found. (13/21)
62% of the disks had no attempts of data removal.
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This is similar to previous study in the UK in 2005 where it was clear
that an attempt of data removal was clear for 48% of the disks.
Operating System: (18/21) 86% of the disks analysed had an
installation of the Windows operating system. (2/21) 9.5% of the disks
had an installation of the Apple Mac operating system, whereas (1/21)
4.5% of the disks operating system was unrecognisable. This could
have been due to the attempts of removal, however, information was
still extracted from these disks.
Organisation identifiable: (7/21) 33% of the disks originated from the
corporate sector, which the organisation could be identified. These
ranged from large financial institutions, marketing consultancies,
auctioneers, electrical companies, heating and plumbing companies,
legal solicitors and mobile communication companies. Information
included customer’s names and addresses, invoices, financial records
of past jobs, emails, organisation charts and other relevant documents
relating to the organisation.
In the UK study in 2005 57% of the disks originated from the
corporate sector, and in 2006 47% of the disks were identified as
corporate.
Personal Information: (13/21) 62% of the disks were identified as
personal computers, or home user PCs, where (1/21) 5% were
unrecognisable.
In the UK study in 2005 and 2006, 59% and 49% respectively hard
disks contained information that was user identifiable.
From the 62% of the Personal computers, (7/13) 54% of the Personal
Computers could identify their previous owner, this included names,
addresses, phone numbers, date of birth, and in some cases even bank
records, and Revenue and Social Insurance (RSI) number.
(2/21) 10% of the disks contained RSI numbers. Of the 10% of the
Disks, (1/2) 50% was from corporate sector and (1/2) 50% was from
private home user.
Financial: (5/21) 24% of the disks contained credit card information.
(3/21) 60% of these disks that contained credit card information
originated from the corporate sector. Alarmingly one of these disks
contained a spreadsheet of at least 300 credit card details, along with
expiry numbers, names and addresses. This disk came from the
corporate sector that was involved in the organisation of sponsorship
for a large charity event held in Ireland.
Passwords: (10/21) 48% of the disks contained passwords. These
ranged from passwords to online sites, email sites, mobile phone sites,
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etc.
Illegal Material: (12/21) 57% of the hard disks contained illegal
material. Of the 57% of the hard disks, (3/12) 25% of the disks were
originating from the corporate sector and the remaining (9/12) 75%
were from home users.
The extent of the illegal material was from illicit photographs,
references to illicit sites, or pirated material. Illicit in this context is
used to mean images that may be considered to be pornographic. Pirate
material may be considered to be pirated music or movies, downloaded
illegally from online sources.
Period of Life: (20/21) 95% of the disks could identify the period of
time when the system was in use. These dates dated from 1994, to as
recent as 2006. (1/21) 5% of the disks dates could not be identified.
The types of information recovered from the disks were quite detailed and
specific. A document retrieved from one disk that originated from a marketing
consultancy revealed over 300 names, addresses and credit card details from
sponsorship of a large charity event held in Ireland.
A number of other small organisation’s disks revealed RSI numbers for their
staff, along with VAT numbers, emails containing invoices to customers and
also quotations for future work. One particular disk included installation details
of electrical work, and also manuals for electrical services installed at various
sites around the country, some of which were academic institutions, and civic
offices.
Another disk found originated from an insurance broker. The disk had full
installation of various insurance quotation packages. This disk also revealed
lists of potential customers, with contact names, addresses and phone numbers,
along with quotation prices. Bank details for this insurance broker were also
found on this disk.
Day to day running of a solicitors office notes were found on a disk believed to
be originated from a leading employment law firm. The disk may have been
from the office administrator, as notes were found, and letters of
correspondence to clients were also found. These letters contained information
regarding various employment law cases, along with names, addresses and
contact details of the clients involved.
A mobile telecommunications company disk was also found. This disk
contained various emails to clients. Various credit card numbers, along with
names and addresses were found belonging to business customers. Lots of
network information was found on this disk, along with internal IP addresses.
One email gave full details, along with username and passwords, for an
internal website. It was evident that this machine was used in the customer
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service department of the company.
4. IMPLICATIONS
There are many implications resulting from the data retrieved from the
research. These include, and are not limited to:
Identity theft – The level of information available on the disks that belonged to
the corporate sector and individuals could make it possible for identity theft or
cloning. This information ranged from name, address, RSI number, email
address, online banking details, credit card numbers, date of birth and other
passwords to online mobile phone accounts etc. In Ireland in 2006, an
estimated 15,000 people suffered from some sort of identity theft, and cost to
business and consumers of approximately €250 million a year (MxSweep,
2006). Many Personal CVs were found, these could also be used as a great
source of information for identity theft.
One of the disks revealed information regarding a user using an online
networking site. The information revealed a member chatting on an online chat
room, relating to pregnancy. In recent reports in Ireland 2 in 5 people who use
social online networking sites, have been victims of Identity theft, as people
put too much personal information on their sites (Breaking News, 2007). These
sites include the popular Bebo, and Facebook.
ID theft does not only happen to individuals. In May of this year, M&S in
Northern Ireland became a victim of Identity theft security, when one of their
laptops was stolen. The laptop contained salary details, addresses, dates of
birth, national insurance and phone numbers of some 26,000 employees has
been stolen from a printing firm, which was tasked with the job of writing to
workers about pension changes (Leyden, J, 2007).
Fraud – In many cases, the range and dept of information found belonging to
the corporate sector would allow a fraudster to either manipulate the
information to advantage or to generate false invoices, as many invoices were
found on the disks. Other types of fraud could generate false documentation,
such as quotes, references or letters of qualifications from the information
revealed on the disks.
Blackmail – Of the PCs which contained inappropriate material, the users
could be identified, and hence this information could be used to blackmail the
user as they were downloading or browsing pornographic material, and in one
instance, while at work.
Industrial Espionage – The level of information gathered concerning the dayto-day running of various organisations, along with financial figures, customer
details, organisation charts, a competitor would be able to perform a very
accurate analysis of the financial capability of a number of operations run by
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the organisation. The potential financial cost of this information, becoming
known could potentially be rated as high.
Legislation neglect – Some of the disks that originated from the corporate
sector had various levels of information regarding client data. As part of the
corporate sector, dealing with clients, they have a responsibility and duty of
care for this information from both the business perspective and the individuals
in question. The duty of care is incorporated in a range of legislation, the most
obvious and relevant area being the Data Protection Act.
With all of the disks originating from the corporate sector, 33% in total, it is
certain that these were in breach of the Data Protection Act and have failed in
their duty of care to the business.
5. CONCLUSIONS
The results of the research mirror the results found in the USA in 2003, and the
UK and other countries where the research has also been performed in 2005
and 2006. This shows that it is an ongoing problem not only in Ireland, but in
all parts of the world.
The table below shows a comparison of the results of the 2005 and the 2006
disk surveys in the UK along with the results of the study performed in Ireland
in 2007.
Table 1: Comparison of results of the 2005 and 2006 surveys

2005*
Total Number of Disks UK

116

2006*

2007

253

Total Number of Disks Ireland

26

Faulty/Unreadable

13 (13 %)

90 (36 %)

5 (19%)

Wiped

17 (16 %1)

73 (45 %1) 0 (0%1)

Commercial Data Present

60 (70 %2)

42 (47

7(33%2)

%2)
Individual data present

51 (59 %2)

1

44 (49

13

%2)

(62%2)

Percentages are of the readable disks
Percentage of readable disks that had not been wiped
* Results taken from UK 2006 report (Jones, 2006)

2
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This research should make general computer users and members of the public
aware of the implications of careless disposal procedures. In the cases of the
organisations disposing of their information, members of the public should
enquire about the standards and procedures in place for the disposal, as the
system could contain their information.
Home users should take adequate measurements to dispose of their data also in
a manner whereby they are not at risk for their information to be accessed by a
fraudster.
A simple format or deletion of files will not remove information from the PC
hard disk. Large organisations should be aware of the proper disposal of
information methods, as it is necessary by legislation. If they have these
practises already in place it is clear that their procedures are not being managed
properly.
Hard drive wiping tools are available, both commercial and freeware, that will
adequately overwrite the data on the hard drive. These wiping tools offer user’s
options of overwriting every sector on the hard drive from once to a hundred
times. These tools overwrite every sector of the hard drive with binary 1's and
0's. There are tools available that meet government security standards even
overwrite each sector multiple times for added protection. These tools can be
found widely on the Internet.
Home users and corporate sectors should use such wiping tools before they
dispose of their hardware.
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